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MM assessing real rates, the central issue
is their relationship to an equilibrium
interest rate...level that, if maintained,
would keep the economy at its produc-
tion potential over time. Rates persisting
above that level, history tells us, tend to
be associated with slack, disinflation,
and economic stagnation— below that
level with eventual resource bottlenecks
and rising inflation, which ultimately en-
genders economic contraction. Maintain-
ing the real rate around its equilibrium
level should have a stabilizing effect on




Since the late 1970s, the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) of the Fed-
eral Reserve System has set ranges for
growth of money and debt at the begin-
ning of each year, as required by the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act. These ranges
are reconsidered at the FOMC's July
meeting, where preliminary ranges are
chosen for the next calendar year.
Monetary targets were intended not
only as policy guides, but also as a
means to communicate the thrust of
monetary policy to others—particu-
larly in regard to its long-term inten-
tions. For example, in the 1980s the
FOMC sought to slow trend money
growth in order to reduce the inflation
rate over time. Financial markets have
thus paid a great deal of attention to
monetary targets.
The usefulness of monetary targets
both as a policy guide and as a means
to communicate policy intentions has
traditionally owed in large part to the
relatively simple and stable relationship
between money and prices. In recent
years, however, it has become evident
that this historical relationship is no
longer as reliable as it once was. Pru-
dence suggests that the FOMC look to
alternative longer-term guides. It is in
this context that Chairman Greenspan
has identified real interest rates as "one
important guidepost," while also not-
ing that estimates of real interest rates
and their equilibrium values themselves
embody a great deal of uncertainty.
This Economic Commentary examines
the concept of a real interest rate and
presents some estimates of real rates on
both short-and longer-term Treasury se-
curities. The results show that although
analysis of real interest rates may add a
forward-looking element to the policy
process, the relationship between real
interest rates, output, and inflation is
complex and difficult to assess. Given
these complexities, a real-interest-rate
guidepost is not likely to serve as well as
monetary targets have done as a device
for communicating long-term policy
intentions, especially in regard to infla-
tion. I contend that supplementing the
policy process with an explicit long-
term objective, especially for a nomi-
nal anchor on the price level, could
serve to eliminate some of the uncer-
tainties attending the assessment of real
interest rates.
• Real Interest Rates
It is useful to emphasize that the real in-
terest rate is an ex ante, not an ex post,
concept. Ex post real rates for any finan-
cial instrument may be obtained by
subtracting the actual average annual
The recent breakdown in the relation-
ship between M2 and the price level
has led the Federal Reserve to exam-
ine alternative longer-term policy
guides. One such guide is the real in-
terest rate. While this focus adds a
forward-looking element to the policy
process, the relationship between real
interest rates and policy goals is com-
plex and difficult to assess. Thus, the
usefulness of a real-interest-rate guide-
post as a means for communicating
long-term policy intentions is limited,
especially in regard to inflation.
inflation rate (over the term of the in-
strument) from the nominal rate of the
instrument. Ex post interest rates are
not viewed as relevant for economic de-
cisions, particularly over long horizons,
since they cannot be known at the time
a loan is made. Decisions are instead
based on an anticipated return, which
necessarily involves some forecast of
inflation.
Real interest rates are not directly observ-
able, of course, but may be inferred
from nominal interest rates and esti-
mates of inflation expectations. The
common method for estimating the real
interest rate is based on a hypothesis
proposed by Irving Fisher in the early
part of this century. Fisher accepted the
premise that forward-looking borrow-
ers and lenders did not always presume
price stability, but would anticipate
that the price level would vary from
time to time. Thus, lenders would seek
ISSN 0428-1276compensation for any expected loss in
nominal value due to expected changes
in the price level. Very simply, Fisher's
hypothesis is summarized by
(1) i«r+p'\
where i is the nominal rate, r is the real
rate, and p
e is the expected average
annual inflation rate over the term of
the instrument.
The Fisher hypothesis implies that the
nominal rate rises point-for-point with
anticipated inflation, leaving the real
rate unaffected. Thus, the real interest
rate can be estimated by subtracting the
expected inflation rate from the observ-
able nominal interest rate. Fisher believed
that inflation expectations were based
both on information about the future
and on past observations. Moreover, he
argued that inflation expectations are
slow to develop and slow to disappear.
A monetary policy guided by the real
rate thus would need at least two com-
ponents: 1) a method for assessing in-
flation expectations to estimate an ex
ante real interest rate; and 2) a means
for estimating the equilibrium real rate
so that actions could be directed toward
moving the rate closer to its equilib-
rium value.
• Estimates of Real Rates
Figure 1 shows that the real federal
funds rate, the interest rate on bank re-
serves set by the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, has hovered near zero in recent
quarters. Because fed funds are of such
short duration, this estimate is based on
actual inflation for the same quarter.
Such low real rates have not occurred
since the 1970s, when they prevailed
over much of the decade. Thus, some
analysts fear that if allowed to persist,
current rates might generally lead to
inflationary imbalances.
Estimates of real rates on instruments
with longer maturities require meas-
ures of expected inflation over the term
of the instrument. Survey data are an
important source of information on
such expectations. Unfortunately,
these data are few, and new sources
would be costly. In many cases, avail-
ability is sporadic and just plain non-
existent for most horizons.
Figure 2 uses existing survey data to esti-
mate ex ante real rates for both one-
year and 10-year Treasury securities.
The one-year real rate is based on annual
inflation expectations from the Univer-
sity of Michigan's Survey of House-
holds (UMSH). A 10-year real rate is
based on each of the UMSH and Hoey
(economic decisionmaker) surveys
when available.
Currently, the estimated real interest
rates across maturities are relatively
low at both the short and long end.
The estimate of the one-year Treasury
rate has been negative for four consecu-
tive quarters. The 10-year Treasury
rate—considered to be less influenced
by policy and more by underlying eco-
nomic conditions—is substantially
higher, although it too is near its bot-
tommost level since 1975. The differ-
ence, or yield curve, between long-term
and short-term real rates, however, is
high by historical experience. The
steep slope is also interpreted as being
unsustainable if inflationary imbalances
are to be avoided.
• Inflation Expectations
In discussing the role of real interest
rates as a policy guide, Chairman
Greenspan was careful to note the un-
certainties embodied in estimates of ac-
tual and equilibrium interest rates. One
key uncertainty is related to the preci-
sion with which inflation expectations
can be measured. This problem can be
illustrated at both the 10-year and
one-year horizons.
Figure 3 presents the two series on
long-term inflation expectations used
to estimate the real rate on 10-year
Treasury bonds. The Hoey survey polls
decisionmakers— including financial
managers, analysts, and economists—
regarding their expectations of infla-
tion over a 10-year horizon and reports
the average value of responses. This se-
ries begins in September 1978 and
ends in February 1991. The UMSH
polls households concerning inflation
expectations over a horizon of five to
10 years; due to data limitations, the
median value of responses is reported
here. This series, while more sporadic
in the early years, has recently become
available continuously on a monthly
frequency since early 1991.
The differences between the two series
in common periods offer a crude sense
of the potential imprecisions of such
data. These discrepancies may reflect
any number of factors, such as differ-
ences in samples, the form of the ques-
tions individuals are asked, and what
inflation measures are implied. More-
over, it not clear how representative the
survey sample is for estimating the expec-
tations of securities traders.
Both series seem to be consistent with
Fisher's conjecture that inflationary expec-
tations are slow to develop and slow to
disappear. As a benchmark, figure 3 in-
cludes a measure of inflation 10 years
ahead to enable a comparison between
what was expected and what actually
happened. In 1980, for example, survey
respondents predicted that inflation
would average about 9 percent over the
decade; in fact, it amounted to only half
that much. This peak in 10-year expec-
tations occurred about eight years after
ex post inflation peaked and converged
only slowly to the lower level of infla-
tion experienced in the decade.
Some analysts argue that the slow con-
vergence reflects the heightened uncer-
tainty of markets about future price-
level increases. Moreover, this vigilance
on future inflation leads many to believe
that the mistakes of the 1970s are less
likely to recur. Convincing evidence
for such a conjecture, however, would
require observing policy over several
episodes that include inflation shocks
of the kind experienced in that decade.
A similar picture emerges at a one-year
horizon. Figure 4 presents the mean
value of the UMSH responses on ex-
pected inflation for one year ahead. These
data are available quarterly from 1956
onward. Since 1981, annual inflation
expectations have been relatively sta-
ble around a 4 percent rate, roughly
consistent with the average rate overFIGURE 1 THE REAL FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
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SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
the same period. Nevertheless, actual
annual inflation over the same horizon
has on occasion drifted persistently be-
low its expected level. As a result, some
believe that the series is biased, pointing
to the skewness in the distribution of sur-
vey responses as confirming evidence.
In light of the skewness, many analysts
prefer to use the median value, rather
than the mean value, of survey responses.
Indeed, some surveys report only the
median value. Figure 5 contrasts the
UMSH mean and median expected in-
flation rates and the median of the Con-
sumer Price Index forecasts of the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters compiled
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Phila-
delphia. Although all the series move
together, survey medians are typically
lower—sometimes by as much as two
percentage points. The appropriateness
of any measure remains controversial,
again illustrating the degree of uncer-
tainty embodied in estimating real inter-
est rates.
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• The Equilibrium Real
Interest Rate
The notion of an equilibrium interest
rate is often identified with Knut Wick-
sell. He formalized a theory around
two concepts: a natural rate of interest,
essentially the rate that realizes savings
and investment necessary for the opti-
mal level of output and employment, and
the money (or market) rate, the interest
that banks charge on loans. The natu-
ral rate is essentially determined by real
investment opportunities, while the
money rate is determined in the market
for loanable funds and can be affected
by the central bank.
Wicksell made no distinction between
real and nominal interest rates, perhaps
reflecting the prevailing influence of
the gold standard, which then anchored
the price level. Under that regime, infla-
tion was neither persistent nor forcastable.
Hence, nominal interest rates were tan-
tamount to ex ante real rates. Moreover,
Wicksell advocated a policy aimed at a
constant price level. Thus, the equilib-
rium real interest rate implied an equi-
librium zero inflation rate.Modern versions of the Wicksellian
framework imply an equilibrium real
rate associated with inflation stability
rather than price-level stability. Here,
maintaining the real interest rate
around its equilibrium value would
serve to stabilize the rate of inflation
around some predetermined level.
Such a policy framework would require
an explicit objective for inflation. While
the Federal Reserve has not been pre-
cise about its price-level goals, it has
established a consistent pattern of annual
monetary targets over the past decade,
providing a basis on which to identify
such an objective.
Under the real-interest-rate approach,
discrepancies between the natural and
money rates set in motion a cumulative
process that produces the sequence of
outcomes described in Chairman
Greenspan's testimony. That is, periods
during which the market rate persist-
ently exceeds the natural (that is, equi-
librium) rate are associated with slack,
disinflation, and economic stagnation.
Conversely, periods during which the
market rate persistently falls below the
natural rate are associated with rising
inflation, culminating in economic con-
traction. Maintaining the market rate
around its equilibrium value produces
price stability and directs output growth
toward its long-term potential.
Unfortunately, there is no simple way
to measure this equilibrium rate. Evi-
dence suggests that the equilibrium real
interest rate can vary substantially. This
seems clearly illustrated over the past
two decades. Table 1 presents outcomes
for inflation and output along with esti-
mates of real interest rates for the first
two years of the last three expansions
lasting that long. One finds no simple
correspondence between the estimated
level of real interest rates and output
growth or inflation. For example, rapid
expansions can occur when real inter-
est rates are both high (early 1980s)
and low (mid-1970s). A sluggish expan-
sion can also ensue when real rates are
low (early 1990s).
The rapid growth in the U.S. economy
in the 1980s in the face of such high
real interest rates surprised many econo-











1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
a. 10 years ahead.
b. 5 to 10 years ahead.
NOTE: All data are quarterly.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics; the University of Michigan; and Barclays
de Zoete Wedd. Inc.











1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991
NOTE: All data are quarterly.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the University of Michigan.mists. Such unprecedented levels were
previously thought to be inconsistent
with a booming economy. The puzzle
was addressed in the 1985 Economic
Report of the President, which con-
cluded that
...the high level of real interest
rates is in large part attribut-
able to the major change in
business depreciation allow-
ances ..., which raised the real
after-tax internal rate of
return on new business invest-
ment. With a higher rate of re-
turn on new investment, it is
worthwhile for businesses with
little cash but good investment
opportunities to borrow at
higher interest rates to finance
investment.... The substantial
increase in the prospective rate
of return on business invest-
ment has therefore pulled up
the real rate of interest in the
financial markets.
In recent months, however, the puzzle
has been to explain the limited extent
of the expansion given the depressed
interest-rate structure. The substantial
cumulative easing of policy over the
past four years has reduced short-term
rates to near zero. Why, then, has the
recovery that began in mid-1991 been
so sluggish?
Chairman Greenspan addressed this
question in his July testimony, identify-
ing "the build-down of national defense"
and "sharply reduced spending on non-
residential real estate in response to
overbuilding" as key elements dampen-
ing output growth and the equilibrium
interest-rate structure. At the same time,
business investment in labor-saving
technologies has depressed employ-
ment growth and made households
more frugal. Cautious spending has in
turn reduced prospective rates of return
on investment opportunities. The net
impact has been to encourage consum-
ers and businesses alike to pay down
debt and "repair their balance sheets."
The Chairman has compared these cir-
cumstances to driving in the face of a
50-mile-per-hour headwind.
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a. Expressed as percentages for first two years of economic expansion.
SOURCES: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; the University of Michigan. Survey of Consumers; and Barclays de
Zoete Wedd, Inc.
It seems clear that the equilibrium
structure of real interest rates has no
simple interpretation. Indeed, policy-
makers may fail to anticipate or even
to recognize changes in equilibrium
real rates until long after the fact. This
serves to illustrate the great uncertain-
ties attending the use of real interest
rates as a policy guide.
• Some Concluding Thoughts
The breakdown in the relationship of
M2 with economic activity and infla-
tion has led the central bank to focus
on alternative longer-term policy
guides. One such guidepost is real inter-
est rates. Given the inherent uncertain-
ties in estimating levels of actual and
equilibrium real interest rates, however,
only rough judgments can be made.Notwithstanding these limitations, real
interest rates are low by historical stan-
dards. Short-term rates—those most
influenced by policy—are near zero
and in some cases negative. Long-term
rates, which are essentially determined
by economic and financial conditions,
are substantially higher. This configura-
tion suggests that markets expect short-
term rates to head higher eventually.
Policy guides are useful not only as a
basis for motivating changes in mone-
tary policy, but also as a means of com-
municating its intentions to the public.
In this regard, monetary targets have
served particularly well, especially in
relaying the central bank's goals in re-
gard to long-term inflation. This has to
some extent reflected the simplicity of
the widely accepted connection between
trend money growth and inflation. But
the complexity of the relationship be-
tween real interest rates and policy objec-
tives necessarily limits its role as an
informational device, especially
where inflation is concerned.
Under these circumstances, a frame-
work for policy expressed in terms of
ultimate objectives would help to reduce
uncertainties associated with a real-
interest-rate guidepost. Explicit
long-term targets, especially for a
nominal anchor on the price level,
would be an important component
of such a framework.
• Footnotes
1. See 1993 Monetary Policy Objectives,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, July 20, 1993, p. 10.
2. Survey data are, of course, not the only
source of information on inflation expecta-
tions. Estimates of such expectations are
sometimes derived from econometric mod-
els or from market-based alternatives that
compare ordinary bonds with indexed
bonds. For example, see Joseph G. Haubrich
and Ann M. Dombrosky, "Gilt by Associa-
tion: Uncovering Expected Inflation," Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic
Commentary, June 1, 1992.
3. For a formal treatment of the cumulative
process model associated with Wicksell. see
Thomas M. Humphrey, "Cumulative Proc-
ess Models from Thornton to Wicksell,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 72, no. 3 (May/June
1986), pp. 18-25.
4. See Economic Report of the President.
Transmitted to the Congress, January 1985,
p. 35.
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